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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
strictive approach, the Second Circuit has diluted the provisions of the
FOIA and may have so severely blunted the thrust of the entire Act as
to prevent its use as a weapon in the fight against the "curse of bigness"
in governmental agencies.
PRE-I'DucrrIoN REVIEW
Naskiewicz v. Lawyer
When a potential Army inductee objects to his draft board's de-
cision to deny him a deferment, he usually finds that immediate re-
course to the courts is not available. As a general rule, Congress has
prohibited pre-induction judicial review of Selective Service orders.24
However, in Naskiewicz v. Lawyer,25 the Second Circuit held that,
where a registrant has been denied the benefits of Selective Service
regulations enacted for his benefit, a district court has jurisdiction to
review.20
The petitioner had been given an ophthamological examination
at the Cleveland office of the Armed Forces Entrance Examining Sta-
tion (AFEES) and was found unfit for military service after originally
24 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970) reads:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any
registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to
a criminal prosecution....
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, the draft law contained no specific provision
pertaining to judicial review of Selective Service board decisions. However, the Supreme
Court, in two important cases, considered this problem. In Falbo v. United States, 320
US. 549 (1944), an appeal of a criminal prosecution of a Jehovah's Witness who had
refused to report for the mandatory civilian work alternative to military service, the Court
refused to review the local board's decision on the grounds that the applicant had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946),
where the problem of exhaustion of remedies did not exist, the Court ruled that, in the
event of a criminal prosecution, it will have jurisdiction to review a decision of a draft
board. Id. at 123. The Court, in defining the scope of its jurisdiction to review in such
proceedings, stated that "[t]he question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only
if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant." Id. at 122-23.
See also Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54
CAzIF. L. Rav. 2123 (1966).
It was the Second Circuit's decision in Wolf v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16,
372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) that aroused Congress to enact § 460(b)(3). See Oestereich v.
Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 US. 233, 244 n.7 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). In Wolf, which involved registrants who were reclassified I-A as a result of
their participation in an anti-Vietnam war rally, the court of appeals ruled that the
restrictions on judicial review of a board's decision did not apply when first amendment
rights were involved. In order to prevent such an expansion of the judiciary's power to
review Selective Service Board opinions, which power was felt to cause unnecessary and
costly delays to the induction system (113 Cong. Rec. 15, 426 (1967) Conf. Rep. No. 346
(June 18, 1967) 1 US.C.CA.N. 1360 (1967)), Congress moved to restore the stricter "criminal
prosecution" principle resulting in § 460(b)(3).
25456 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1972).
26Id. at 1168. The district court had dismissed the appellant's action on the ground
that it lacked jurisdiction.
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
being classified as qualified by his local draft board which had not
given him such an examination.27 The Cleveland AFEES then for-
warded its findings to the Syracuse, N.Y., draft board, the office nearest
plaintiff's residence, whereupon the plaintiff's records were further
reviewed and he was again classified as medically fit for service in the
Armed Forces.
The court held that such a procedure was in clear violation of the
Selective Service's own regulations.28 Agreeing with the registrant, the
court stated that he was indeed prejudiced because of the unwarranted
extra review of his medical file by the Syracuse A-FEES and, therefore,
the induction order based on the results of the improper procedure
must be ruled invalid.29 The district court was instructed to direct the
petitioner's local draft board to forward his files directly to the United
States Army Recruiting Command, excluding the extra, unwarranted
evaluation by the Syracuse office, for de novo decision as to Naskiewicz's
medical qualification. 0
The Second Circuit based its finding that jurisdiction exists to re-
view and overrule, prior to induction, a Selective Service determination
on the principle that a court can intervene in the induction process
when the Selective Service has acted in a "basically lawless" manner.31
Since the Supreme Court has declared that administrative bodies must
adhere to their own regulations as well as to statutes,32 the court rea-
27 Naskiewicz was permitted, after repeated requests, to take an ophthalmological
examination in Cleveland instead of at his local Syracuse office because he was employed
in Cleveland at the time of the classification proceedings. See Local Bd. Memorandum
No. 121 § III(c) (June 25, 1971) which provides in part:
If the registrant is away from his local board area, he should have the opportunity
to apply for transfer for necessary consultation and reexamination under the same
criteria applicable to transfer for Armed Forces pre-induction examination.
456 F-2d at 1169 n.6.
28 Local Bd. Memorandum No. 121 § 11(c) continues:
The AFEES to which the registrant is delivered for required reexamination or
consultation must receive all medical records and copies of correspondence and
other documents as appropriate in order to identify the reexamination or con-
sultation as a part of the procedure outlined in this local board memorandum and
submit for final review to Headquarters, USAREC . .. . UPon completion of the
review of medical records or accomplishment of reexamination or consultation by
the AFEES, the inquiry, together with the registrant's medical records, all in-
formation and tenative determination will be forwarded to Headquarters,
USAREC, by the AFEES.
456 F.2d at 1169 n.6.
29 456 F.2d at 1169.
8Od. at 1169-70.
31 Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 US. 233 (1968).
82 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), where a review
was granted because the Board of Immigration had failed to exercise its discretion,
contrary to existing valid regulations. See also Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), where
the discharge of a Foreign Service officer was held invalid because it violated regulations
of the Department of State which mandated an unfavorable finding by the Department's
[Vol. 47:223
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soned that a natural extension of the "basically lawless" rationale
would include application of the rule where a registrant has been de-
nied the benefits of Selective Service regulations that have been enacted
for his benefit. 83
In taking this position,34 the court aligned itself with the Third3 5
and Eighth 6 Circuits which have recently reached similar conclusions.
This position is, however, contrary to that of the Fourth Circuit which
chose to read the non-review statute literally and, in Blatt v. Local Bd.
No. 116,37 held that the plaintiff's claim that he was not medically
Loyalty Security Board or the Deputy Under Secretary before a dismissal for security
reasons.
The Second Circuit has also indicated that post-induction jurisdiction exists to order
the Armed Forces to obey their regulations developed for the protection of servicemen.
United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
83 456 F.2d at 1168.
34 In Martire v. Selective Service 33d. No. 15, 442 F.2d 895, 896 (2d Cir. 1971), the
Second Circuit implied that it would review the decision of the draft board if the applicant
was in fact denied a medical interview on the ground that such action would be considered
"basically lawless" and thus within the bounds of the exception carved out by Oestereich v.
Selective Service. This decision was completely rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Blatt v.
Local Bd. No. 116, 493 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 37 & 38 and accompanying
text infra.
8r Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197, 438 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1971). The draft board failed to
reopen the case of the registrant after he notified them of his impending fatherhood
which would entitle him to a III-A classification. The court ruled that since Hunt was
prima fade entitled to such a deferment, the board's failure to reopen his case in violation
of 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1969) constituted a "basically lawless" act necessitating judicial
review.
86 Liese v. Local Bd. No. 102, 440 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1971). The registrant was ordered
to report for induction in December, 1969. Prior to that time, he was arrested during a
peace demonstration and ordered to stand trial in February, 1970. When he notified his
local board, he was told not to report as scheduled and to inform the board of the out-
come of the criminal case. The board did not send Liese the written form for postpone-
ment of induction or any other written notice that he was not to report, said omission
being in direct violation of 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2 (1962). The court felt that such a violation
of federal regulations was indeed suffcient to fall within the "basically lawless" exception,
and also to qualify under the doctrine advocated in its own previous decision in Zerillo
v. Local Bd. No. 102, 440 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1971). There the court stated that Section
460(b)(3) should not be read literally so as to preclude review in all instances other than
that specifically mentioned and ruled that review is possible when there exists a clear
departure from statutory mandate.
In a separate dissent, Judge Gibson argued that a failure to precisely follow the
federal regulation should not qualify under either definition. Id. at 647.
87 443 F 2d 204 (4th Cir. 1971). About to lose the student deferment that he possessed,
Blatt hoped to obtain a medical exemption. Although the board was in receipt of his
medical information it failed to schedule a medical interview for Blatt either prior to or
immediately after classifying him I-A. The board's failure to so schedule an interview was
in violation of 32 C.F.R. § 1628.2 which provides:
Registrants to be given medical interview
(b) Whenever a registrant who is in Class I-A... claims that he has one or more
of the disqualifying medical conditions or physical defects . . . the local board
shall order him to present himself for interview with the medical advisor to the
local board at the time and place specified by the local board....
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qualified for service in the armed forces was not subject to review until
offered as a defense in a criminal prosecution for refusal to report or
as the basis of a habeas corpus proceeding after induction. The court
refused to reach the merits of the registrant's claim that federal regu-
lations had been violated since it concluded that jurisdiction did not
exist to review the decision of the draft board. It felt that the basic
issue involved was a factual one, not one of law, although Blatt had
attempted to frame it as a question of law through use of a procedural
irregularity argument. The factual question, according to the Fourth
Circuit, was simply whether or not the applicant was medically quali-
fied for military service. The court reasoned that, since the determina-
tion was subject to board discretion, the petitioner was not entitled to
pre-induction review.8
The difference between the Second and Fourth Circuits evolves
from the distinction that the Supreme Court drew in the companion
cases of Oestereich v. Selective Service 9 and Clark v. Gabriel, 40 where
it first carved out the "basically lawless" exception. In Oestereich, the
Court held that pre-induction review was available to a divinity student
who was stripped of his ministerial exemption since a denial of such a
88 The Court cited Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, 445 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1971), where review
was denied a registrant who, after receiving an induction notice, claimed conscientious
objector status and was denied it. In Blatt, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the board's
decision was within its discretion as a question of fact and, as a result, not subject to
judicial review until the initiation of a criminal prosecution for refusal to be inducted or
through the use of a habeas corpus petition after induction. Such a decision, the court
reasoned, was the only logical one in light of the Supreme Court's 1968 holdings in
Oestereich v. Selective Service, 393 U.S. 233, and Clark v. Gabriel, 393 US. 256, discussed
in text accompanying notes 39 & 40 infra. Oestereich and Clark, in the eyes of the Fourth
Circuit, permit review only when a clear statutory mandate is violated. In support of this
proposition, the court cited Winick, Direct Judicial Review of the Actions of the Selective
Service System, 69 MicH. L. REv. 55, 75 (1970). However, the court failed to mention that
the author attacked what he felt to be the flaw in this principle and, in fact, called for
expanded review of the Selective Service. See note 42 infra.
89 393 U.S. 233 (1968). Petitioner Oestereich had been enrolled in a divinity school
and held the applicable exemption. As a result, his draft board revoked his exemption
and reclassified him I-A. The Court ruled that, since the applicant had a clear statutory
right to such an exemption, the board, by refusing to reinstate that exemption, had acted
in a "basically lawless" manner, thus permitting judicial review.
40 393 U.S. 256 (1968). The registrant applied for and was denied a conscientious
objector deferment. The Court ruled that no judicial review was possible here since
the board was authorized to grant conscientous objector status only upon its satisfaction
that the applicant had fulfilled the necessary criteria. The Court reasoned that, as long as
the board was involved in a matter subject to its discretion, it would not review the
board's decision.
Read together, the two cases establish the principle that, when a decision of a draft
board is in violation of a clear statutory mandate concerning a matter not subject to
administrative discretion, review is permitted. However, if the subject matter is within
the realm of administrative discretion, review is not possible.
[Vol. 47:223
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classification was not within the power of the draft board. In Clark, on
the other hand, it was held that, where the exemption was subject to
the discretion and judgment of the board, the petitioner could obtain
review only as provided by statute. In distinguishing Oestereich, the
Court in Clark stated that the denial of the exemption in the latter case
".... inescapably involves a determination of fact and an exercise of
judgment."'
The Court's decision to distinguish the two cases by noting that
one involved a matter of discretion while the other did not has been
criticized. It has been pointed out that the ministerial exemption, like
that of conscientious objector, requires a local board to weigh the facts
in order to reach a proper determination.42 Thus, the ultimate ques-
tion is whether the registrant has presented such a degree of proof that
the board, by denying the classification, has abused its discretion in
the face of that overwhelming proof.
In any event, the distinction between Oestereich and Clark should
not be deemed to preclude the Second Circuit's holding in Naskiewicz.
On the contrary, the general principle enunciated in Oestereich justi-
fies the Second Circuit's extension of the "basically lawless" doctrine.
41393 U.S. at 258. These cases could have been more easily distinguished. That is,
Oestereich involved the revocation of an exemption and a subsequent reclassification while
the action in Clark was simply an initial classification. However, had the Court chosen
this mode of distinction, the impact of Oestereich would have been severely restricted.
42 Winick, Direct Judicial Review of the Actions of the Selective Service System, 69
Miyr. L. Ray. 55, 71 (1970). The author states that regardless of the statement by the
Court that the classification in Oestereich was not discretionary (393 U.S. at 258), the
classification was dependent on local board discretion and fact-finding to the same extent
as the determination in Clark.
In addition, the author advocates an even greater degree of judicial review of the
Selective Service since he contends that, contrary to the arguments of the advocates of ad-
ministrative finality, the delay created would be slight and the military would still be
able to reach its manpower requirements. Furthermore, Mr. Winick argues that the
threat of review by the courts would make local boards act more carefully and would
thus prevent misconduct which broad discretionary power often encourages. Id. at 109-10.
See also Note, Pre-Induction Judicial Review, 57 CALiF. L. REv. 948, 994 (1969), where it is
argued that limiting review to cases of criminal prosecution is too harsh. The author cites
Mr. Justice Douglas for support:
[Clourts do law and justice a disservice when they close their doors to people who,
though not in jail, nor yet penalized, live under a feeling of peril and insecurity.
What are courts for, if not for.., adjudicating the rights of those against whom
the law is aimed, though not immediately applied.
Public Officers Ass'n, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 116 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Another writer suggests that a specialized Selective Service Court, analogous to the
current Tax Court, be established. This court would have the double benefit of protecting
the rights of individuals and permitting speedy action so as to avoid any delay in the
functioning of the Selective Service System. Donahue, The Supreme Court v. Section 10(b)(3)
of the Selective Service Act: A Study in Ducking Constitutional Issues, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
908, 955-68 (1970).
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Indeed, the fact of violation of Selective Service regulations in Nas-
kiewicz could not, even through the use of the most perverted logic,
result in the conclusion that such an action was discretionary. Whether
or not the underlying question is one of fact and, therefore, subject to
the local board's discretion (the issue the Fourth Circuit thought deci-
sive), is irrelevant when a regulation is violated. Jurisdiction to review
is sought not to insure a particular result, but, more fundamentally, to
insure that the result be reached in a lawful manner.
